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After thirty years of protracted war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), Sri Lanka defeated its long-lasting terrorist insurgency in May 2009. Sri Lanka’s 
victory surprised the world. This thesis examines why Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism 
strategy succeeded in 2009 when it had previously failed. Discriminatory government 
policies, the economic liberalization in the 1980s, and external support fueled Tamil 
insurgency and terrorism on the island. International settings in the 1990s enabled the 
Tamil diaspora to consolidate support in the Western world, and LTTE evolved as a 
hybrid terrorist organization. The behavior of the LTTE and its sympathizers overseas 
explains how the changing external conditions affected insurgency and terrorism in Sri 
Lanka. Though globalization and the end of the Cold War created new patterns of 
transnational terrorism, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack and the U.S.-led “war on 
terror” changed the world’s opinion about terrorism. Therefore, this thesis argues that the 
change in international opinion on accommodating insurgency and terrorism after 
December 2001 strengthened the cooperation among countries combatting terrorism and 
had an impact on counterterrorism in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan victory proved that 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts succeeded after the external conditions 
changed. 
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Sri Lanka—once known as Ceylon—is located in the Indian Ocean, twenty-one 
miles off the southern tip of India. This tiny island, which has twenty-two million people, 
is composed of a multi-ethnic and multilingual plural society. According to the World 
Fact Book, the majority, the Sinhalese people who speak the Sinhala language, represents 
74.9 percent of the population, while the minority Tamils represent 15.4 percent and 
speak Tamil. The two communities are divided along religious lines of Buddhism and 
Hinduism with a small minority of them, 7.4 percent, being Christians. Muslims on the 
island are the third largest ethnic group, representing 9.2 percent of the population and 
speaking both Sinhala and Tamil. The remaining 0.5 percent is comprised of other ethnic 
minority groups such as the Malay, the Burgher, and indigenous people, the Vedda.1   
At its independence in 1948, the “Pearl of the Indian Ocean,” Sri Lanka, was 
expected “to be a success story in the developing world.”2 However, the Tamil 
insurgency movement started in early 1970 and lasted until May 2009. This protracted 
conflict caused nearly 90,000 deaths, and “its economic cost…have exceeded 20 billion 
USD, nearly twice the size of Sri Lanka’s 1996 Gross Domestic Product.”3 In 2009, “Sri 
Lanka militarily defeated the first insurgency and the terrorist campaign of the 21st 
century. Although the threat of terrorism was neutralized in Sri Lanka, it will remain a 
world-wide threat for many years to come.”4 Therefore, it is important to examine Sri 
Lanka’s successful 2009 counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy, because it may 
help resolve similar terrorist movements in the future. Maintaining peace in Sri Lanka is 
important due to its geographic position in the Indian Ocean. Peace in Sri Lanka affects 
the peace and stability of the entire South Asian region. Since the majority of world sea 
                                                 
1 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact Book: Sri Lanka,” last modified September 28, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html. 
2 Nikolaos Biziouras, The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Economic 
Liberalization, Mobilizational Resources, and Ethnic Collective Action (London: Routledge, 2014), 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4Jayathilaka et al., “Defeating Terrorism the Sri Lankan Experience,” Business Today, July 2011, 43.   
 2 
trade is centered in the Indian Ocean, as pointed out by scholars, a peaceful Indian Ocean 
region directly affects world peace and stability.5  
From 1977 to 2006, the successive governments of Sri Lanka led by four previous 
presidents have applied the universally accepted theories and principles of 
counterinsurgency in fighting Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka without success. Finally, 
after thirty years of protracted war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
the Sri Lankan state defeated its long-lasting insurgency in May 2009. The defeat of the 
LTTE shocked a vast group of interested parties in the international arena, because the 
counterterrorism strategies recommended by the counterterrorism literature had not 
worked until then. 
The success of the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE could not have been 
possible if the United States of America had not declared its “war on terror.” Many 
powerful countries and international organizations changed their perspective on 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies after December 2001. This contributed 
to the enforcement of many restrictions on terrorism and its related activities worldwide. 
Therefore, as a result of the changing environment worldwide after December 2001, 
international terrorism and insurgency declined. The Sri Lankan government was able to 
exploit this changing situation to strengthen its counterinsurgency mechanism while the 
LTTE was not in a position to sustain its capabilities.  
A change in international opinion about insurgency and terrorism after December 
2001 strengthened the cooperation among countries in combatting terrorism and had an 
impact on counterterrorism in Sri Lanka as well. On September 12, 2001, the day after 
the most brutal terrorist attack took place, “the United Nations [UN] Security Council 
passed Resolution 1386 (2001)”6 in which it denounced the attack as a “threat to 
international peace and security and expressed its readiness to combat all forms of 
                                                 
5 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2010), 5–16.   
6 R. James Woolsey, “Forwarded,” in Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, ed. Yonah 
Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 375. 
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terrorism.”7 Other international organizations, too, outlined various recommendations to 
face the “growing threats of terrorism.”8 Although the LTTE was in an advantageous 
position at this time, the fact that it unilaterally declared a ceasefire in December 2001 
indicates how the changes in the global and domestic environment “affected both coerced 
and willing LTTE contributors.”9 This behavior of the LTTE and their supporters 
overseas explains how the changing external conditions affected counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism. The Sri Lankan case is a clear example of how counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism efforts began to work more effectively after external conditions 
changed. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Without external support, it was difficult for terrorists or insurgents to wage a 
protracted war against a legitimate government. Empirical evidence has proven that 
insurgents or terrorists have always counted on foreign assistance for their logistical and 
ideological requirements.10 This was the case with the LTTE as well. It was impossible 
for the LTTE to survive nearly thirty years without external assistance, especially in an 
island nation like Sri Lanka. As discussed in the counterinsurgency literature, Bruce 
Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw emphasized the importance of external cooperation 
amongst governments and security forces to fight against terrorism or insurgency. 
“Foreign collaboration and counterinsurgency campaigns are capricious, depending 
completely on the individual political and economic interests of the countries 
involved.”11 Therefore, this thesis examines the question of why Sri Lanka’s 
counterterrorism strategy succeeded in 2009 when it had previously failed. What were the 
variables that changed and allowed it to work in 2009, and how might Sri Lanka’s 
experience be applied to more general counterterrorism theories?  
                                                 
7 Woolsey, “Forwarded,” in Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, 375. 
8 Ibid., 375–376.   
9 C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lesson Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and 
Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 65–66. 
10 The IRA in Northern Ireland and Montoneros in Argentina could be examples.    
11 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and 
Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 127. http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3506. 
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B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Sri Lankan case is significant to study as a single case study because, after 
thirty years of sheer struggle using counterinsurgency methods, Sri Lanka defeated the 
LTTE. I show that the setting did not change domestically, and neither did the state’s 
strategies. This requires a comparative analysis of different timeframes. While there are 
statistics about deaths, military, and support structure, they did not help explain the 
international setting. Therefore, this qualitative research, based on a single case study, 
covers four timeframes: the first is from the years 1976 to 1985.12 The second is from 
1985 to 1992.13 The third covers the period from 1992 to 2001,14 and the fourth is from 
2002 to 2009.15  The research assesses the empirical evidence to test the two potential 
causes—the impact in Sri Lanka of the change in international opinion on defeating 
terrorism and insurgency, and the influence of India’s stance on counterinsurgency in Sri 
Lanka. 
C. HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT 
This study presents two hypotheses. The first hypothesis argues that the change in 
international opinion after September 11, 2001, affected foreign collaboration, which 
then had an impact on the defeat of the terrorist and insurgency movement in Sri Lanka. 
Thus, the first assumption is that if the “war on terror” had not been declared by the 
United States in 2001, it might not have been possible for the government of Sri Lanka to 
defeat terrorism and insurgency on the island in 2009. The civil war would have 
continued. The second hypothesis explores the Sri Lankan government’s role in 
managing India during the period from 2002 to 2009. India’s influence on the separatist 
movement in Sri Lanka had a direct impact on the Sri Lankan government’s policy 
                                                 
12 The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976. India’s opinion on the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) 
fighting the insurgency shifted after the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on October 
31, 1984. 
13 During this period, the Indian government under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi pioneered peace 
talks between the GoSL and the LTTE. He also inducted the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri 
Lanka after the Indo-Lanka pact. An LTTE suicide bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991.   
14 After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, once again the political stance of India had 
changed over the Sri Lankan issue.   
15 This was the period since 9/11 up to the defeat of the LTTE. 
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decisions over counterinsurgency. Therefore, the second hypothesis suggests that India’s 
supportive stance, unlike in the past and despite Tamil Nadu pressure, facilitated the Sri 
Lankan government to continue its successful counterinsurgency operations in 2009.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides a summary and a critique of the literature on 
insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies because they have been used often to 
explain the defeat of the LTTE. It also examines historical and current literature on Sri 
Lanka’s political system and insurgency. By doing this, this thesis points to some 
important gaps in studies about why the LTTE insurgency ended. I have used three types 
of literature. First, the literature on the counterinsurgency theories that are relevant to the 
Sri Lankan case; second, literature on the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism effort covering the period from the 1970s to 2009; and finally, literature 
on the aftermath of the post-9/11 “war on terror.” This review demonstrates that the 
existing literature is not sufficient in explaining the LTTE’s defeat and determines which 
gaps needed to be filled in order to properly explain this historic event. 
1. Counterinsurgency Theories 
It is important to understand this lens of analysis because these theories have been 
applied to counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka. Several scholars argue that these strategies 
will work given certain contexts. In Sri Lanka, however, they were applied repeatedly, 
but did not work initially. Eventually, the insurgency did end in 2009. What changed? It 
is important to review this. The counterinsurgency theories mentioned in the U.S. Army 
Field Manual FM 100-20, Military Operation in Low Intensity Conflicts, and Field 
Manual FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,16 were applied in the Sri Lankan case. Similarly, 
Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw’s book, A Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency,17 also discusses the counterinsurgency strategies 
                                                 
16 Departments of the Army and Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts (FM 100–
20, AFP 3–20) (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990),  Department of the 
Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24, MCWP 3–33.5) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006) 
17 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and 
Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992),  http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3506. 
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adopted in many countries of the world, which are equally applicable for Sri Lanka, as 
they were used there as well. 
The U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-20 identifies insurgency and 
counterinsurgency as two aspects of the same process. It describes an insurgency as a 
process in which insurgents are focused on radical change in political control through 
extensive use of covert instruments and methods.18 Therefore, counterinsurgency refers 
to “all military and other actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”19 Based 
on the internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, four principles of 
counterinsurgency are discussed in the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-20. First, “unity 
of effort” refers to coordinated action and centralized control at all levels. The second is 
the “maximum use of intelligence” as the basis for all actions. The third is “minimum use 
of violence” by authorities to maintain order, and the fourth principle is a “responsive 
government” within which positive measures taken by the leadership are recognized as  
necessary to mobilize manpower, resources, and to motivate its people.20 
According to U.S. Army and Marines Field Manual FM 3-24, political authority 
plays a critical role in an insurgency. “Counterinsurgency thus involves the controlled 
application of national power in political, information, economic, social, military, and 
diplomatic fields and disciplines.”21 As per Field Manual FM 3-24, counterinsurgency is 
“an extremely complex form of warfare.”22 Therefore, it states several successful 
counterinsurgency operational practices, such as  
• emphasize intelligence,  
• focus on the population, their needs, and security,  
• establish and expand secure areas, 
• isolate insurgents from the population (population control),  
                                                 
18 Departments of the Army and Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts, 1–24. 
19 Ibid., 2–7. 
20 Ibid., 2-9 – 2-10. 
21 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 
22 Ibid. 
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• appoint a single authority, usually a dynamic, charismatic leader,  
• conduct effective, pervasive psychological operations,  
• provide amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents, 
• place police in the lead with military support,   
• expand and diversify the police force,  
• train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations,  
• embed special operations force and advisors with indigenous forces, 
• deny the insurgents sanctuary.23   
As pointed out by Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, every nation needs 
a counterinsurgency plan.24 After reviewing the counterinsurgency campaigns in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa, Hoffman and Taw have come up with four fundamentals that any 
government should include in its counterinsurgency or counterterrorism national plan 
irrespective of geographic regions, times, and political systems. First, “an effective 
overall command and coordination structure;” second, “confidence-building or 
‘legitimizing’ measures and anti-terrorist legislation developed to weaken the terrorists 
while strengthening public support for the government;” third, “coordination within and 
between intelligence services;” and finally, “foreign collaboration amongst governments 
and security forces.”25  
Since 1980, successive governments of Sri Lanka have applied the theories and 
principles of counterinsurgency discussed in the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-20, 
U.S. Army and Marines Field Manual FM 3-24, and Hoffman and Taw’s book, A 
Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, to the Sri Lankan case, 
but they could not achieve success until 2009. From 1977 to 2006, successive 
governments of Sri Lanka, led by four presidents (J. R. Jayewardene, R. Premadasa, D. 
B.Wijetunge, and C. B. Kumaratunga), applied both “hard” and “soft” aspects of 
                                                 
23 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1-24. 
24 Hoffman, Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism, 3. 
25 Ibid. 
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counterterrorism26 but could not achieve victory over the LTTE. Therefore, this thesis 
explores why the theories did not work in a certain timeframe but did work in another in 
the context of countering terrorism and insurgency in Sri Lanka. 
2. Sri Lanka’s Political System and Insurgency 
Case studies by Robert J. Art, Louise Richardson, and Ahmed S. Hashim provide 
insight about why the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency did not work until 2009. Robert J. 
Art and Louise Richardson, in their book, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons 
from the Past, discuss the Sri Lankan state response to the LTTE insurgency.27 
According to them, by 1983, the Sri Lankan military had struggled to face the escalating 
violence; therefore, the government was not in a position to conduct counterinsurgency.28 
Security forces and the police were weak institutions that were poorly trained. They 
lacked both resources and combat experience. After July 1983, the military deployed in 
the north of the country had to face intense violence. Furthermore, the government had 
failed to win the “hearts and minds” of the population.29 Art and Richardson state that, by 
the end of 1984, “the security forces had increased in size and quality of weaponry, but a 
national concept of operation was lacking.”30 Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government 
had sought the support of the United Kingdom and Israel to enhance its military 
capabilities to face counterinsurgency. However, the increased attacks on civilians by the 
insurgents created a “state of serious disorder.”31 In 1984, President Jayewardene 
initiated actions to establish the Joint Operation Center (JOC) to coordinate the armed 
forces and the counterinsurgency operations. However, movement toward a political 
solution was lacking due to political outbidding. Thus, the entire country was under 
insurgent threat.32   
                                                 
26 Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 486–489. 
27 Ibid., 495–501. 
28 Ibid., 495. 
29 Ibid., 496–497. 
30 Ibid., 497. 
31 Ibid., 499. 
32 Ibid., 500. 
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The study by Art and Richardson provides better understanding about the 
strengths and weakness of the political and military actions of successive governments; 
however, their findings do not explain how the changing international environment 
effected the government’s action. While the United States and other external actors are 
mentioned, why are they so important for understanding the continuation and ending of 
an insurgency? This thesis also examines the role of the external players is an important 
condition for effecting change.   
After analyzing the entire counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign in 
Sri Lanka, Ahmed S. Hashim published a book titled When Counterinsurgency Wins.33 
According to Hashim, dynamics of political, military, and diplomatic factors led the Sri 
Lankan government to the remarkable victory in 2009.34 Analyzing the reasons for 
previous failures, Hashim states that the “GoSL [government of Sri Lanka] was never 
able to implement military effectiveness across the board, from political and strategic to 
operational and tactical levels; nor was military effectiveness extensively embedded in 
the Armed forces.”35 Therefore, these weaknesses significantly caused the failures in 
government efforts in Eelam Wars I–III (1983–2006).36 As Hashim says, from the very 
beginning, the conflict in Sri Lanka has been marked as distinctive because their political 
process continued while fighting. Indian assistance for the LTTE was obvious during the 
period of President Jayewardene, where Eelam War I (1983–1989) occurred.37 Hashim 
explains that, during Eelam War II (1990–1994), the LTTE was successful in organizing 
its military capabilities to reach conventional levels. Dramatic assassinations of high 
profile political figures by the LTTE characterized this phase of the war with terror.38 To 
force the LTTE to the “negotiation table,” President Kumaratunga’s government 
commenced military offensives that resulted in heavy losses to both the parties during 
                                                 
33 Ahmed S. Hashim, When Counter Insurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of Tamil Tigers 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
34 Ibid., 179. 
35 Ibid., 180. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 88. 
38 Ibid., 99. 
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Eelam War III (1995–2000).39 According to Hashim, this situation changed in Eelam 
War IV (f2006–2009). The changes implemented by the government of Sri Lanka and the 
military during Eelam War IV “proved to be the catalyst that took the Sri Lankan military 
from victory to victory.”40 Hashim highlights political will, regional and international 
engagement, mobilization and involvement of the population, and operational and tactical 
restructuring of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces as the four key elements that facilitated the 
victory.41 As Art and Richardson do, Hashim’s study also provides an objective analysis 
on the Sri Lankan case. It gives a better understanding about the political and military 
situations of successive governments that dealt with the insurgency and terrorism in the 
island. Hashim identifies regional and international engagement as one of the key 
elements for the government’s success in 2009, but cannot explain much about the events 
that took place in the international arena other than the defense cooperation by the 
government to acquire arms and ammunitions. 
The change in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies of many powerful 
nations and international organizations contributed to enforce many restrictions on 
terrorism and its related activities worldwide. Therefore, due to this changing 
environment after 2001, international terrorism and insurgency were in decline. Hence, 
the government of Sri Lanka was able to exploit this changing situation to strengthen its 
counterinsurgency mechanism while the LTTE was not in a position to sustain its 
capabilities. In order to show this, this thesis examines important literature on the “war on 
terror” at the global level, such as, The War on Terror by the Council on Foreign 
Relations,42 The Five Front War,43 and The British War on Terror.44 This literature 
expands our understanding of the important roles of players and conditions around 
insurgencies. 
                                                 
39 Hashim, When Counter Insurgency Wins, 101–102. 
40 Ibid., 180. 
41 Ibid., 180–189. 
42 Council on Foreign Relations, The War On Terror (New York: Foreign Affairs/Council on Foreign 
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3. What Went Wrong with the LTTE 
It is important to understand the LTTE leadership, its capabilities, and the reasons 
for their failure since the leadership strongly influenced the strategy of the LTTE. Rex A. 
Hudson argued that “the mindset of a terrorist group reflects the personality and ideology 
of its top leader.”45 According to some researchers, the leader of the organization, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, was a “megalomaniac.”46  The explanations in former child 
soldier Niromi de Soyza’s book, Tamil Tigers: My Story as a Child Soldier in Sri Lanka’s 
Bloody civil war also proved the fact that Prabhakaran was a megalomaniac ruthless 
killer.47 According to C. Christine Fair, the LTTE was not the first to introduce “suicide 
terrorism” to the world; however, when analyzing the suicide attacks carried out by 
various militant groups during the period from 1980 to 2000, the number of suicide 
attacks by the LTTE placed them on the top of the list, being responsible for 168 such 
attacks.48 The writings of Hudson, de Soyza, and Fair provide better awareness about the 
character of the LTTE leadership, which helps to analyze the survival of the LTTE 
organization and its leadership for thirty years.  
Two books by M. R. Narayan Swamy—Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s Story and 
Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World’s Most Ruthless 
Guerrilla Leader49—discuss the entire counterinsurgency campaign in Sri Lanka and the 
reasons why the LTTE failed in 2009. Swamy has pointed out “five major factors that 
contributed to the eventual and complete destruction of the LTTE, which itself was 
responsible for four of these.”50 The first was the assassination of former Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Second was the LTTE’s decision to pull out from the 2003 peace 
                                                 
45 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? 
(Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1999), 64, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/.  
46 Ibid., 97.  
47 Niromi de Soyza, Tamil Tigers: My Story as a Child Soldier in Sri Lanka’s Bloody civil war 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2011), 301. 
48 C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lesson Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and 
Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 40–41. 
49 M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s Story (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2010), 
M. R. Narayan Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the World’s Most 
Ruthless Guerrilla Leader, 6th ed. (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2008). 
50 Swamy, Tiger Vanquished, 179. 
 12 
process, which annoyed the international community. The third factor was the split 
among the LTTE. Fourth was the actions by Tamils to boycott the presidential election of 
2005 under pressure of the LTTE that paved the way to elect Mahinda Rajapaksa as the 
president. A high level of cooperation among the institutions under President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa’s government was the fifth factor.51 As a journalist, Narayan Swamy was 
writing about the Sri Lanka issue since the 1980s. Hence, his conclusions provide 
comprehensive information on the LTTE’s actions that is important for this research. 
However, Swamy’s books lack information about the effects of the global “war on terror” 
on the LTTE.  
Hashim, too, analyzes the reasons for the LTTE’s defeat in 2009. He points out 
that “The LTTE defeat is a classic example of the implosion of an insurgent 
organization.”52 He observes serious political and strategic errors, deeply embedded 
structural problems, and decline in military strength and operational capabilities—due to 
the change in international setting as Chapter II shows—as the major factors that led to 
the defeat of the LTTE.53 Hashim’s findings are quite different from Swamy’s, but he, 
too, does not discuss the effects of the changing international environment on the LTTE.  
According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, terrorist campaigns may drag on for decades 
but they always come to an end.54 In her book, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Cronin identifies six patterns to end forms 
of terrorism: “decapitation, negotiations, success, failure, repression, and 
reorientation.”55 Knowledge about the distinctive role of a terrorist leader may lead to 
capturing or killing him. This refers to decapitation. Understanding the reasons why 
governments and terrorists negotiate can result in the entry of terrorist groups to 
legitimate political processes.56 Achieving the aim of the terrorist group may lead to 
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“success,” whereas collapse or loss of public support leads to “failure.”57 “Repression” 
refers to the military actions and use of force by governments to defeat and eliminate 
terrorists groups.58 “Reorientation” is a process in which terrorist groups convert from 
terrorism to other forms of violence.59  
Cronin’s book—published in 2009, the same year the LTTE was completely 
defeated, including decapitation of its leader—discusses Sri Lanka as an important  case 
study “because of the LTTE’s extensive and notorious use of terrorist tactics, especially 
suicide attacks…it is also a case that was strongly affected by the international 
counterterrorism initiatives put in place after 2001.”60 According to Cronin, several peace 
negotiation attempts between the government and the LTTE have not ended the terrorist 
violence; instead, unsuccessful negotiations finally made both parties stronger militarily, 
but weak politically.61 When analyzing the change in the world order after 9/11, she only 
discusses the Sri Lankan government’s action to improve the training of its military and 
improve the capacity to fight the counterinsurgency war.62 What is missing is the larger 
context of changes in global financing and setting. However, Cronin’s book fulfills the 
theoretical aspects to understand how insurgency ends, which are important to 
understanding the end of the LTTE. 
4. Foreign Collaboration in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the literature on effects of changes in the 
international environment on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The literature 
shows that it was impossible for the LTTE to survive nearly thirty years without external 
assistance, especially in an island nation like Sri Lanka. Hoffman and Taw emphasize the 
importance of external cooperation amongst governments and security forces to fight 
against terrorism or insurgency. They explain, “Foreign collaboration and 
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counterinsurgency campaigns are capricious, depending completely on the individual 
political and economic interests of the countries involved.”63 Analyzing the Sri Lankan 
case, Art and Richardson touched upon foreign collaboration factors but failed to cover a 
broader international spectrum. They discussed how India’s political stance changed in 
the Sri Lankan issue after the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 
October 1984. They also highlight India’s decision to curtail covert assistance, intervene 
in the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency operations in the north, and send in Indian Peace 
Keeping Forces (IPKF) from July 1987 to March 1990.64 Hashim also discusses regional 
and international engagement. He emphasizes the Sri Lankan diplomatic initiatives in 
countering transnational activities of the LTTE. He also discusses how the government of 
Sri Lanka got help from China while “the West was unwilling to do so due to 
humanitarian concerns; India was reluctant because of its domestic situation.”65   
Change in international opinion on insurgency and terrorism after 9/11 
strengthened cooperation among countries combatting terrorism. Art and Richardson as 
well as Hashim, discuss the impact of external support on the counterinsurgency victory 
in Sri Lanka, but could not explain how the changing environment of the world, 
especially after 2001, influenced the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States and the U.S.-led “war on terror” 
has changed the world’s viewpoint on accommodating insurgency and terrorism. Thus, it 
had an impact on counterterrorism in Sri Lanka. On September 12, 2001, the day after the 
most brutal terrorist attack took place, “the United Nations [UN] Security Council passed 
Resolution 1386 (2001),”66 in which the council condemned the attack as a “threat to 
international peace and security and expressed its readiness to combat all forms of 
terrorism.”67 Other international organizations, too, outlined various recommendations to 
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face the “growing threats of terrorism.”68 While having an advantageous position over 
the Sri Lankan military, the LTTE’s unilaterally declared ceasefire in December 2001 
portrays the number of changes in the global and domestic environment that “affected 
both coerced and willing LTTE contributors.”69 Hence, I observed a gap in the literature 
explaining the effect of the change in conditions in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism. In order to increase our understanding, I show that the 
counterinsurgency efforts worked better after the external conditions changed. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In order to understand how the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts 
worked more effectively after the external conditions changed, this thesis questions why 
the counterinsurgency strategies failed previously and then succeeded later in Sri Lanka. 
Therefore, Chapter I, the introductory chapter, encompasses the research question, 
research design, hypothetical argument, and a literature review. Chapter II discusses the 
background to the insurgency, evolution of the LTTE as prominent terrorist organization, 
and the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency efforts prior to 2001 and after 2001 up to 2009. 
Chapter III discusses and analyzes the pre-2001 and post-2001 regional and international 
setting and its impact on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and specifically, the 
implications for Sri Lanka. Finally, Chapter IV provides a summary analysis and 
thoughts on future implications of counterinsurgency strategies.  
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE INSURGENCY, EVOLUTION OF 
THE LTTE, AND THE SRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
EFFORTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Background information about the insurgency movement and the evolution of the 
LTTE as a prominent terrorist organization are both necessary in order to understand how 
the changing world order has influenced the country’s domestic politics. First, a history 
of the insurgency movement provides the reader with an understanding of why an ethnic 
conflict emerged in Sri Lanka after its independence in 1948. It also gives the reader a 
better understanding of how the majority Sinhalese government’s actions created 
discontent among minority Tamils, what motivated these actions, and what external 
forces aggravated the conflict. Second, this chapter explains how the LTTE was the only 
insurgent group of several Tamil groups that evolved into a lethal terrorist organization 
that then waged a protracted war against the central government. Finally, this chapter 
covers the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency efforts prior to 2001 and after 2001 up to 
2009—two distinct periods marked by the September 11 attacks in New York that 
reshaped the ways in which the world dealt with terrorism. The findings show that the 
universally-accepted counterinsurgency methods adopted by the Sri Lankan government 
prior to 2001 closely mirrored the counterinsurgency methods adopted after 2001 until 
the insurgency and terrorism ended in 2009, raising the question of what changed. The 
purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for this thesis. 
B. POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF TAMIL INSURGENCY 
After Sri Lankan independence in 1948, malpractices in political, social, and 
economic arenas led the island into a volatile situation that culminated in a full-fledged 
civil war in the 1980s. The British colonial administration from 1815 to 1948 embraced a 
centralized and unified form of governing system on the island, which laid the foundation 
for neglect of the regions in Sri Lanka. According to Neil De Votta, “Britain’s colonial 
policies and practices helped create fissures, especially between the majority Sinhala and 
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minority Tamils.”70 Prior to 1948, the bureaucracy in Colombo made policy decisions on 
development and allocation of resources for provinces and districts without consulting 
the respective regional authorities. This centralized control and decision-making process 
led to an unequal distribution of resources and an imbalance in development among the 
administrative districts. After independence, policy makers and bureaucrats did not take 
any steps to decentralize these powers, thus allowing their practices to continue.71 After 
1948, the ongoing prejudicial and ineffective policy decisions made by successive 
governments resulted in further tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, which 
eventually erupted into violence. 
From 1948 to 1994, two main political parties decided the development policies 
in Sri Lanka: the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). 
The UNP was in power during the periods of 1949–1956, 1965–1970, and 1977–1994. 
The country was under the SLFP during the periods of 1956–1959, 1960–1965, and 
1970–1977. Describing the characteristics of the two main political parties, the economist 
Sirimal Abeyratne notes: 
The UNP is known to be center-right political party, of which the 
ideological position has favored a market-friendly policy environment, 
allowing greater room for the function of the private sector…The SLFP 
emerged as a Centre-left party favoring regulated and state-dominated 
economy, and constituted the main alternative to the UNP. Political and 
economic thinking of the SLFP has also been influenced to a greater 
extent by the socialist ideology.72   
Many Tamils considered some of the constitutional legislation passed by the 
successive governments as discriminatory towards the minorities. In particular, the 
following legislative acts contributed significantly to tensions between the communities: 
• The Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948: Denied citizenship for Tamils 
of Indian origin.  
                                                 
70 Neil De Votta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implication for Politics and Conflict 
Resolution in Sri Lanka (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007), 70.   
71 Chelvadurai Manogran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1987), 149–150. 
72 Sirimal Abeyratne, “Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka,” The World 
Economy 27, no. 8, (August 2004): 1303, http://ssrn.com/abstract=597015. 
 19 
• Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956: Designated Sinhala as the official 
language.  
• Constitution of 1972: Disengaged from the British Commonwealth and 
created republic of Sri Lanka as an independent unitary state. Buddhism 
was recognized as the national religion. 
• Standardization Act of 1973: Give higher education priority, in the form of 
university selections, to Sinhalese students. 
• Constitution of 1978: Established an executive presidential-type 
government. 
• Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979: Abrogated all legal and 
constitutional safeguards concerning arrest and proscribed all Tamil 
nationalist movements. 
• Sixth Amendment to the Constitution in 1983: Required all members of 
parliament to take an oath renounce separation.73  
In discussing the Sri Lankan conflict, Chelvadurai Manogran concludes, “The 
policy of discrimination against the Tamil community fostered by Sinhala-dominated 
governments has reduced the minority to an oppressed group.”74 
By 1948, the Federal Party, later known as Tamil Arasu Kachchi, led by S. J. V. 
Chelvanayakam, was at the forefront of the demands calling for the decentralization of 
administration for Tamils, but without a clear mandate. However, later in 1956, having 
won ten parliamentary seats at the general election, the Federal party was in a stronger 
position to protest against the Sinhala Only Act—the Official Language Act No. 33 of 
1956 implemented by the Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s SLFP government. 
Tamils considered this official language act discriminatory and a denial of their language 
rights. Instead of demanding decentralized administration, the Federal party started to 
advocate for a separate Tamil linguistic state.  
Under the British administration, Tamils with good English language skills were 
offered higher positions in the government. Tamils wanted to be able to educate their 
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children in their native language and interacted with the government and general society 
using their own language. But to their disappointment, Sinhala was made the only official 
language of independent Sri Lanka. By 1958, learning Sinhala was a prerequisite for 
Tamils to secure employment in the government, Tamils voiced their disagreement 
through peaceful demonstrations against the government. These non-violent protests were 
confronted by Sinhalese mobs, which ignited the anti-Tamil ethnic riots in 1956.75  
The Tamils demanded that the administration create federal policies designed 
especially to safeguard their job opportunities in Tamil majority districts. However, 
Sinhala extremists protested against this because they believed that it would lead to 
complete independence. On the one hand, the “federalists did not demand political 
independence but they had wanted some measures of economic independence.”76 On the 
other hand, both Tamil and Sinhala politicians did not make a serious effort to educate 
their communities about the regional autonomy and power-sharing at the provincial level 
within which the power was mainly limited to the activities involving regional and rural 
development. Due to political outbidding between the main political parties, the Sinhala 
politicians hindered the government from granting franchises to the Tamils. The term 
outbidding refers “to the location of party positions on a given dimension. Outbidding 
occurs when parties assume positions toward the endpoints on this dimension.”77 This 
outbidding jeopardized one of the most significant political solutions offered to resolve 
the problem, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957.78 
By 1957, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Federal party leader S. J. V. 
Chelvanayakam had come to an agreement with the aim to solve the ethnic problem. The 
agreement signed on 26 July 1957 addressed three major concerns. First, the state agreed 
to acknowledge the official status of the “Tamil language for administrative purposes in 
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the Northern and Eastern provinces.”79 Second, it agreed to modify the draft Regional 
Councils Bill to accommodate some demands of the Federal Party. Third, Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike “agreed to place limits on the settlement of Sinhalese ‘colonists’ in 
irrigation schemes in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, so that the indigenous Tamils 
could maintain their majority positions in those areas.”80 Soon after independence, the 
first Prime Minister D. S. Senanayeke and his UNP government commenced colonization 
in the dry zone under the Gal Oya project. This caused drastic changes to the demography 
in that region.81 Writing on the Tamil’s perspective on this issue, Manogran says, 
“Tamils considered the colonization issue to be the most serious of the problems facing 
them.”82 As traditional farmers, Tamils feared losing their agricultural lands. The 
political pressure from extremists in his own party and the political pressure of the UNP 
forced Bandaranaike to repeal the pact. Therefore, except for the recognition of official 
status for the Tamil language (Tamil Language [Special Provision] Act No. 28), the other 
two issues agreed upon were abrogated.83 The abolition of the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam agreement shaped the second wave of ethnic riots in 1958. 
Except for granting official status for the Tamil language for administrative 
purposes, from 1960 to 1977, no significant progress was made in the government 
towards resolving the grievances of Tamils. By the mid-1970s, “the Tamils had lost 
confidence in the ability of the Sinhala government to redress their grievances.”84  On 14 
May 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) issued its manifesto (Vaddukodai 
Resolution), which demanded the establishment of a separate state “either by peaceful 
means or by direct action or struggle.”85 By 1978, several Tamil militant groups had 
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emerged in northern Sri Lanka to back the Tamils’ cause for independence—the Tamil 
Eelam.  
At this time, the propaganda campaigns of the Tamils also spread overseas as a 
consequence of growing diaspora. C. Christine Fair writes, “The Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora has been a crucial component of the lethality and tenacity of this conflict.”86 She 
further states that of the three waves of Tamil migrations, the second wave of migration 
began in 1956 when several thousand English-educated Sri Lankan Tamils settled in the 
UK, Australia, Canada and the United States.87 The Tamil diaspora in the United States, 
mainly in Boston, managed to influence the U.S. authorities. With that influence, the 
lower house of the Massachusetts legislature adopted a series of resolutions pertinent to 
the conflict in Sri Lanka. One of the resolutions passed on 09 May 1979 stated that it was 
“memorializing the President [of the United States] and the Congress to utilize the 
powers of their offices to rectify the gross injustices which had been inhumanly inflicted 
on the Tamils of Sri Lanka.”88 In addition to the resolutions passed, “the Governor of 
Massachusetts declared 22 May 1979 ‘Eelam Tamils’ Day’ and handed over a copy of 
the resolution to M. Sivasitamparam, Amirthalingam’s deputy, and President of the 
TULF.”89  
The successive political and economic policies influenced by the shift in the 
international environment prejudiced the state-building and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
The spread of economic liberalization across the globe during and after the 1970s 
promoted new forms of economic, political, and social activities in the domestic setting. 
As discussed earlier, the UNP was moving more towards market-oriented economic 
policies and was supported by the business community on the island. The victory in the 
1977 parliamentary elections allowed the UNP government to implement the much-
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promised economic reforms, creating economic liberalization and accelerating economic 
growth on the island. In the face of emerging globalization, Sri Lanka was the first to 
implement open economic policies in the region, even before India. While experiencing 
the results of economic liberalization, foreign donor investments allowed the Sri Lankan 
government to commence massive development projects, such as the Mahavali irrigation 
project that provided much-needed water for farming in the northeastern dry zone. This 
allowed a significant number of Sinhalese to settle in those Muslim- and Tamil-
dominated areas.90 In addition, the open economic policy of the UNP government “has 
devastated the market-oriented farming economy of Tamil districts, especially in the 
Jaffna peninsula.”91 
Economic liberalization and the development projects caused further escalation of 
violence. The pro-West policy of Jayewardene’s UNP government antagonized India. 
According to Gordon Weiss, “India had demonstrated its will and capacity to confront 
neighboring states in its 1962 border war with China, and had brought about the 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 from Pakistan.”92 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 
who came to power in 1966, had cordial relations with Sri Lanka during Prime Minister 
Sirimao Bandaranaike’s SLFP government. However, due to the power shift in 1977 
where J. R. Jayewardene became the president, Gandhi’s policies towards Sri Lanka also 
shifted. In addition, the domestic environment for Indira Gandhi changed, as she lost 
control of constituencies across India after the Emergency Act. The southern state of 
Tamil Nadu, in particular, saw a rise of anti-Congress political parties. This then shaped 
indo-Lanka relations for the next twenty years. 
The consequences of the “Cold War” indirectly affected the Sri Lankan internal 
conflict in which India covertly supported the Tamil insurgents in terms of training and 
provided safe havens on Indian soil. As Narayan Swamy writes, “India’s covert 
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involvement in the Sri Lankan Tamil cause dramatically altered the dynamics of the 
separatist movement.”93  Powered by external support, insurgents began offensive action 
against the government. The immediate result was the massacre of thirteen military 
personnel by the insurgents on July 23, 1983, in Jaffna that ultimately ended with the 
most devastating backlash—in the form of mob violence and ethnic riots among 
civilians—in Colombo since Sri Lanka’s independence. “In a sense ‘Black July,’ as the 
massacre came to be known among Tamils, legitimized Tamil chauvinism and militancy 
like never before.”94 Since 1983, until it ended in 2009 with unsuccessful peace attempts, 
the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka had dragged on for nearly three decades, with increased 
levels of violence and ruthless terrorism that had caused enormous economic destruction 
and the demise of thousands of humans. 
C. THE LTTE: FUNCTION AND EVOLUTION 
The LTTE initially developed as an insurgent organization, but later converted 
into a full-fledged terrorist organization and fought against the government forces to have 
a separate country for the Tamils on the island. Since its origin, the strategic vision and 
the final goal of the organization was to create an independent state for Tamils—Tamil 
Eelam—covering 28.7 percent of Sri Lanka’s land mass and 60 percent of its coastline.95 
To achieve its goal, the LTTE was “engaged in an armed struggle of remarkable violence 
through a sustained campaign of guerrilla tactics, semi conventional military actions and 
terrorism.”96 
On May 5, 1976, a 21-year-old named Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the 
LTTE.97 Discussing the leader of the LTTE’s profile, Rex A. Hudson wrote, “After 
dropping out of school at age 16, he [Prabhakaran] began to associate with Tamil ‘activist 
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gangs.’ On one occasion as a gang member, he participated in a political kidnapping.”98 
As a youth, Prabhakaran initiated his first act of violence by setting fire to a state-owned 
public transport bus. Then he established himself as a cold-blooded man by killing 
“Alfred Duriappa, the mayor of Jaffna” on July 27, 1975.99 At the age of 21, Prabhakaran 
was among the initial members to form a militant group called the Tamil New Tigers 
(TNT); he became its co-leader.100 After taking over the control of his gang, Prabhakaran 
renamed the TNT the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since then, the LTTE 
grew to its apex in 2006— by having 25,000 cadres.101 
The LTTE organization gradually expanded as a formidable terrorist organization. 
Describing its expansion, Narayan Swamy wrote, “in the process, the LTTE’s image, as 
an outfit that cannot be defeated by anyone, only got reinforced, making it the most 
feared, fanatic and ruthless outlaw, its ability to destroy, next only to Al Qaeda’s.”102 
Apart from the death of thousands of civilians, LTTE was also responsible for the killings 
of two heads of states, 104 politicians, 1,555 Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) 
personnel, 23,387 Sri Lankan security forces personnel, and 2,825 missing in action 
(MIA).103 While discussing capabilities of the LTTE, Narayan swami pointed out:  
Besides being the only insurgent outfit to own a shipping fleet (after the 
PLO–Palestine Liberation Organization–and IRA–Irish Republican 
Army), the LTTE had its own army, a small but lethal naval wing, a 
nascent air force, artillery units, a fired intelligence wing, a police force, a 
clandestine radio, and an efficient logistic division to buy and ferry war 
material from around the world in the most secretive and sophisticated 
manner. The group’s tentacles reached almost every country. And the 
LTTE had proved its mettle by repeatedly harassing the Sri Lanka 
military–and for over two years the much bigger Indian Army too.104 
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According to the description provided by Waldmann, the LTTE can be 
categorized as an ethnic terrorist group. The goal of ethnic terrorism is to achieve 
“greater autonomy, even independence from the oppressor state.”105 Prabhakaran 
asserted that the Tamils had to have a separate state.106 This ideology of Prabhakaran 
drew public support and motivated Tamil youths to join the insurgency. The members of 
the LTTE represented both men and women from the lower or lower middle class. At the 
initial stage, the average age of most of the members was over 18 years. However, at the 
latter stage, the LTTE even recruited teenagers. According to Hudson “among the 
world’s child combatants, children feature most prominently in the LTTE, whose fiercest 
fighting force, the Leopard Brigade (Sirasu puli), is made up of children (baby 
brigade).”107 
Hudson argued that the “mindset” of each terrorist group is different in nature. 
Therefore, “the mindset of a terrorist group reflects the personality and ideology of its top 
leader.”108 Some researchers have labeled the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, as “Asia’s new Pol Pot,” a “ruthless killer,” and a “megalomaniac.”109 His 
murders included civilians, both local and foreign high profile politicians, Tamil rivals, 
and trusted members and commanders of his own organization.110 The brutal execution 
of his deputy leader, along with 50 other loyal members on December 28, 1994,111 
proved the fact that Prabhakaran was a megalomaniac and a ruthless killer. Prabhakaran’s 
psychopathic behavior can be best understood by analyzing his indiscriminate killings of 
men, women, and children. According to the Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense’s sources, he 
was responsible for murdering over 1,950 and injuring over 400 civilians in vulnerable 
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villages and “the worst of these attacks took place at a Muslim village in Eravur, 
Batticaloa in August 1990, and Killing 173 civilians.”112 
Though terrorism and insurgency are different from each other, insurgents use 
terrorism as a tool. According to Ahmed S. Hashim, “The LTTE, Hezbollah, the FARC, 
and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, are functionally specialized non-state actors. They are 
able to wage terrorism, guerilla warfare, and some form of mobile conventional warfare 
against their opponents.”113 To carry out its terrorist acts, the LTTE was organized in to 
several components with Velupillai Prabhakaran as its leader. The organization’s 
components included the Intelligence wing, Procurement wing, Military wing, 
Communication department, Research wing, Black Tiger wing, Sea Tiger wing, Air Tiger 
wing, and Political wing. The LTTE’s organizational structure is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Outline of the LTTE Organization 
 
 
The increase in external financial assistance for the LTTE helped immensely to 
strengthen its war-fighting capabilities. The presence of a large diaspora and India’s 
willingness to support the organization actively until 1986 created a setting for the 
growth of the LTTE. The Human Rights Watch reported that “By the mid-1990s… 80 to 
90 percent of the LTTE’s military budget [came] from overseas sources, including both 
diaspora contributions and income from international investments and businesses.”114 
This large foreign income source helped the LTTE acquire modern weaponry and 
military hardware such as artillery guns, heavy and medium mortars, anti-aircraft guns, 
surface-to-surface missiles, surface to air missiles, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, 
and small arms. Most importantly, by early 1990, the LTTE established its Air Tiger 
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wing.115 With its air capabilities, the LTTE executed several air strikes in the commercial 
capital of Colombo, which, in addition to economic devastation, caused deep 
psychological impact. The LTTE had obtained seven nonmilitary lightweight aircrafts 
through its front organizations abroad. Those aircrafts were smuggled to Sri Lanka and 
modified for offensive capabilities. From 1989 to 2009, the LTTE had destroyed 52 
aircraft, including commercial aircraft, by using both missiles and ground attacks.116 To 
gain supremacy over the Sri Lankan Navy, the LTTE developed and maintained a 
formidable Sea Tiger wing. This wing had the capability “of countering the security 
forces’ actions through semi-conventional naval tactics and suicide missions.”117 They 
played an important role when smuggling weapons and military hardware to the 
island.118  
The LTTE had an extensive intelligence network externally and domestically, 
which helped thwart counterinsurgency efforts by the Sri Lankan government. Separate 
groups of cadres were involved in gathering information and handling intelligence both 
locally and overseas. The effective intelligence network of the LTTE contributed to their 
success in both assassinations and suicide attacks.119 The political wing of the LTTE, 
headed by the leadership itself, gained its strength during the peace talks and ceasefire 
agreements, where it had influence over government institutions. “The LTTE used the 
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) political party as their proxy both in parliament and 
outside Sri Lanka.”120 While the LTTE was unable to approach some states directly, the 
TNA filled that gap by promoting the separatist ideology of the LTTE internationally 
through its political and diplomatic channels.121  
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D. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT MECHANISM OF THE LTTE 
Comprised of a number of front organizations, the international network of the 
LTTE had engaged in its propaganda campaign, arms procurement, fundraising, and 
criminal activities. Prior to the proscription by the international community, the “LTTE 
front organizations have been set up in 54 locations in 32 countries around the world.”122 
Front organizations such as the World Tamil Forum (WTF), British Tamil Forum (BTF), 
and Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) were successful in misleading the 
international community. These organizations worked diligently to lobby politicians of 
powerful nations with the aim of gaining support for their cause. At one point, they were 
successful in enforcing an “unofficial embargo on military equipment being supplied to 
the Sri Lankan government.”123 Defense sources revealed that the procurement and 
delivery network of the LTTE operated throughout the world and they established a “fleet 
of floating warehouses stationed in international waters off Sri Lanka.”124 The external 
environment allowed this to happen. The LTTE “smuggled arms and ammunitions from 
the far East and Eastern European countries. The bulk of their military hardware had been 
purchased from North Korea; other military hardware was procured from Ukraine and 
Bulgaria.”125   
The LTTE had efficiently used information and diplomacy as tools for their 
hybrid terrorism. As a hybrid terrorist organization, the LTTE improved its capacities to 
become a lethal conventional force. Writing about the facets of terrorism and likely 
prospects Bruce Hoffman points out that the active role played by states in supporting 
and sponsoring terrorism is one of the main causes for increasing lethality.126 The 
training assistance and other logistical support from India enhanced the striking power 
and the capabilities of the LTTE during its initial stage. 
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External support is an essential factor in the survival of terrorist groups. Without 
external support, it is difficult for terrorists or insurgents to wage a protracted war against 
a legitimate government. Without external assistance, it was impossible for the LTTE to 
survive nearly thirty years, especially in an island nation like Sri Lanka. Analyzing the 
dimension of transnational support infrastructure and the external activities of the LTTE, 
Peter Chalk concludes,  
The global reach of the LTTE, was widely recognized to be one of the 
most proficient and dangerous guerrilla / terrorist groups in the world. In 
large part, this reputation is owed to the extremely sophisticated 
international network that has been built by the organization.127  
To disseminate its dogma among the Tamil diaspora in order to raise funds for 
terrorism, “the LTTE maintained a number of television and radio stations, websites, and 
printing presses in several European countries which have a significant Tamil Diaspora 
presence.”128 
The LTTE effectively used Sri Lankan Tamils residing in North America, Europe, 
and Asian countries to raise funds for the organization, thus, financing was never an 
issue. According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), by the year 2000, 
“at least eight non-profit organizations and five companies were operating in Canada as 
fronts for the LTTE.”129 At one point, the LTTE had collected 80 percent of its annual 
operating budget through the Tamil diaspora. By 2007, this fund had reached “an output 
of 200–300 million USD.”130  Other than through the diaspora, the LTTE raised funds 
through both legal and illegal businesses like “international shipping, arms smuggling, 
human trafficking and other businesses.”131 
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E. SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE LTTE 
Two horrific incidences in the history of suicide terrorism affected the survival of 
the LTTE. First, the regional stance on the separatist movement in Sri Lanka changed 
after the killing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE suicide attack. Second, the 
international opinion on terrorism changed after al-Qaeda’s suicide attacks on September 
11, 2001. The LTTE was not the first to introduce suicide terrorism to the world. 
However, when analyzing the suicide attacks carried out by various militant groups 
throughout the world, the number of suicide attacks by the LTTE placed it at the top of 
the list, the organization having been responsible for 168 such attacks during the period 
from 1980 to 2000.132 The pervasiveness of suicide terrorism during the last decades has 
formed a vital part of several terrorist campaigns. Since the first suicide attack carried out 
in Lebanon by Hizballah in 1983, several other terrorist groups in the world have adopted 
this method. Fair pointed out that “Prabhakaran made a strategic decision to adopt the 
method of suicide attack after observing its lethal effectiveness in the 1983 suicide 
bombing of the U.S. and French barracks in Beirut.”133 As highlighted by Amy 
Waldman, “suicide has long been part of the Tiger culture”134  and “the entire LTTE 
could arguably be declared a suicide force of sorts.”135 All the members had cyanide 
capsules and they have shown little hesitation in consuming it, if captured. The LTTE 
started suicide terrorism by killing 40 security personnel when a truck full of explosives 
rammed into an army camp on July 5, 1987.136  Since that time, until November 20, 
2008, 378 suicide bombers of the LTTE (274 male and 104 female) died in action.137 The 
LTTE was the first to use a suicide body suit in South Asia. A female LTTE suicide 
bomber, wearing a suicide body suit, assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India 
in May, 1991. The LTTE also established a naval form of suicide attacks on vessels by 
                                                 
132 Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, 40–41.  
133 Ibid., 38. 
134 Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” The New York 
Times, January 14, 2003. 
135 Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia, 47. 
136 Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing..” 
137 Ministry of Defense, Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis, 22. 
 33 
using explosive-laden small boats. The al-Qaeda attack on the American destroyer U.S.S. 
Cole in 2000, which used a small boat full of explosives, “had been almost identical to 
the Tiger (LTTE) attack on a Sri Lankan naval ship in 1991.”138   
F. END OF THE LTTE 
Cronin identifies six ways to counteract and end forms of terrorism: “decapitation, 
negotiations, success, failure, repression, and reorientation.”139 She further insists that 
“The only way that the United States and its allies can effectively respond to twenty-
first–century terrorism is to formulate their policy with an understanding of how terrorist 
campaigns end and then to follow a plan based on that understanding.”140 Numerous 
peace negotiation attempts between two parties had not ended the terrorist violence in Sri 
Lanka; instead, unsuccessful negotiations ultimately made both parties stronger 
militarily, but weaker politically. Yet, with thirty years of counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism experience, the Sri Lankan security forces had become battle-hardened 
by the latter stage of the fight. They were finally able to defeat the terrorist organizations 
in Sri Lanka. Analyzing the LTTE defeat, Ahmed S. Hashim concludes that “the LTTE 
defeat is a classic example of the implosion of an insurgent organization…the LTTE 
made serious political and strategic errors.”141 Those errors include, first, that the LTTE 
had failed to understand the consequences of the U.S.-led “war on terror” after 9/11 that 
made changes in international policies on counterterrorism. Second, the LTTE made the 
decision to pull out from 2003 and 2006 peace processes and initiated a fight that they 
could not win. Finally, “the LTTE failed [to] effectively integrate its methods of 
terrorism, guerrilla war, and quasi-conventional war. Insurgent organizations traditionally 
have this problem.”142 
What facilitated the LTTE’s survival for 30 years? Was it the result of the 
favorable external conditions they enjoyed or other factors? Both extensive external 
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support and developed effective methods of fighting enabled the LTTE to survive for 
nearly 30 years. They improved some weapon systems. For example, they invented a 
mortar named “Pasiln 2000,” a mortar like the 122 mm canon.143 They also invented a 
suicide waist for suicide bombers. Although the LTTE had not been able to achieve its 
end goal of a separate state, they were successful in their way of surviving for more than 
30 years. As suggested in her organizational approach, Martha Crenshaw explains that 
“terrorist groups are strengthened or weakened as much from their own international 
dynamics as from government counteractions. ‘Winning’ in a conventional sense may not 
be the actual goal of terrorists… The reward is in playing the game.”144   
G. THE SRI LANKAN COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS 
Since 1980, Sri Lanka applied the universally accepted theories and principles of 
counterinsurgency to defeat insurgency and terrorism on the island but could not achieve 
success until 2009. Since 1977, successive governments of Sri Lanka led by three 
presidents—J. R. Jayewardene, R. Premadasa, and C. B. Kumaratunga—applied both 
“hard” and “soft” aspects of counterterrorism,145 but could not defeat the LTTE. Finally, 
the government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa succeeded in defeating terrorism on 
the island in 2009. Previously, the Sri Lankan governments repeatedly applied similar 
strategies, but they did not work initially. Eventually, the insurgency did end in 2009. 
What changed? Why did they not work in a certain period and work in another context? 
The impact of changing international factors after 2001 facilitated defeating insurgency 
and terrorism on the island. 
Providing some insight into why the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency did not work 
until 2009, Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson explain that by 1983, the Sri Lankan 
military had struggled to face the escalating violence; therefore, the government was not 
in a position to conduct counterinsurgency. Their security forces and police were weak 
institutions and poorly trained. They lacked both resources and combat experience. After 
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July 1983, the military deployed in the north of the country had to face intense violence. 
Furthermore, the government had failed to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. Art 
and Richardson state that, by the end of 1984, “the security forces had increased in size 
and quality of weaponry, but a national concept of operation was lacking.”146 
Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government had sought the support of the United Kingdom 
and Israel to enhance its military capabilities to face insurgency. However, the increased 
attacks on civilians by the insurgents created a “state of serious disorder.”147 Though 
President Jayewardene initiated actions to establish the Joint Operation Center (JOC) to 
coordinate the armed forces and the counterinsurgency operations in 1984, movement 
toward a political solution was lacking due to political outbidding. The major political 
parties had taken varying stances on the ethnic issue when they were in and out of power. 
Thus, the entire country was under insurgent threat.148   
During the Cold War in the 1980s, the changing international environment and 
the role of India badly affected the Sri Lankan government’s actions on fighting the 
insurgency. Indian assistance for the LTTE was obvious during the period of President 
Jayewardene, when Eelam War I (1983–1989) occurred.149 While the Sri Lankan 
military was actively hunting Prabhakaran and the government was waiting to give Sri 
Lankan Rupees 300,000 for his head, on May 19, 1982, Indian police arrested 
Prabhakaran while he was hiding in Tamil Nadu. Unfortunately, the extradition request 
by the Sri Lankan government was turned down; instead,  
Unknown to the world, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi opened up a channel 
to Prabhakaran, through the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s 
external intelligence agency. After keeping him in house arrest for seven 
months, Indians let him free. Prabhakaran returned to Sri Lanka in early 
1983 where he continued fighting.150  
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Jayewardene’s government launched its counterinsurgency campaign in the Jaffna 
peninsula—Operation Liberation—in May 1987. When troops were about to capture the 
top leader of the LTTE, India dictatorially called for a halt to the offensive. Indian Air 
Force transport planes escorted by fighter jets violated the Sri Lankan airspace and 
dropped 25 tons of relief materials. India saved Prabhakaran for the second time. Due to 
extensive diplomatic pressure from India, President Jayewardene had to accept a 
ceasefire agreement, and he signed the Indo-Lanka peace accord “under which the GoSL 
agreed to devolve powers to the provinces and acknowledge Tamil as an official 
language; the Sri Lankan military would withdraw to barracks, and the… LTTE... would 
surrender their arms.”151 The Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) deployed in the north 
and the east of the island in July 1987. The LTTE neither surrendered its weapons nor 
cooperated with the implementations of the peace accord, but rather, engaged in fierce 
battles with the IPKF. 
The change of political leadership in both India and Sri Lanka thwarted the 
IPKF’s role. Ranasinghe Premadasa succeeded President Jayewardene in January 1989. 
Rajiv Gandhi, the main power behind the Indo-Lanka peace agreement, lost his 
premiership in December 1989. With the strong protest against the IPKF by Premadasa’s 
government, India was compelled to withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka in March 1990. 
“The IPKF withdrew in fury after heavy losses, but not before roughing up, killing, 
looting and raping the Tamils who came within reach.”152 
During the Eelam War II from 1990 to 1994, the LTTE was successful in 
organizing its military capabilities to reach conventional levels. Dramatic assassinations 
of high profile political figures by the LTTE characterized this phase of the war with 
terror.153 The LTTE commenced this phase of war by attacking twelve police stations 
and killing 600 police officers who had been surrounded. In addition, hundreds of Sinhala 
and Muslim civilians were also massacred. A suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan defense 
Minister Ranjan Wijeratne in March 1991. On May 21 of the same year, Rajiv Gandhi 
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was assassinated on Indian soil by an LTTE suicide bomber. In May 1993, an LTTE 
suicide bomber assassinated president Premadasa. While security forces engaged in 
limited offensives, the LTTE attacked the government naval base at Pooneryn in 
November 1993. All of Sri Lanka was on the verge of collapse. “The spiraling descent 
into violence and terrorism throughout the country gave the government the excuse to 
implement and maintain a state of emergency.”154 
To force the LTTE to the negotiation table, President Kumaratunga’s government 
continued the counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in heavy losses to both parties 
during the Eelam War III from 1995 to 2002. After winning the presidential elections in 
1994, President Kumaratunga expressed her willingness for cessation of hostilities and 
commenced negotiations with the LTTE. As they did in the past, the LTTE walked away 
from the negotiation table and commenced atrocities by exploding two Sri Lankan naval 
gunboats.155  
The counterinsurgency national plan of Kemaratung’s government—war for 
peace—156 was comprised of several offensive operations that were conducted with the 
aim of liberating the LTTE-dominated areas. “Operation Leap Forward” and “Operation 
Revirasa,” which were launched in 1995, managed to regain control south of Jaffna, 
including Jaffna town; however, it was estimated that nearly 2,500 had died, while 
another 7,000 were wounded on both sides. The next major offensives, “Operation Jaya 
Sikuru,” and “Operation Rana Gosa,” were launched in May 1997 and March 1999, 
respectively; both ended without much success.  
While planning major attacks on military bases in the North, the LTTE had 
carried out devastating suicide bombing attacks in the South. An isolated military base in 
Mullativu fell into LTTE hands on July 18, 1996.157 This battle alone caused the death of 
1,200 military personnel and 332 LTTE fighters.158 The Elephant Pass military base, 
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which was established at the entrance to the Jaffna peninsula, fell to the LTTE in 
December 1999.159 The LTTE bombed the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 1996 
and in October 1997; another suicide attack by the LTTE destroyed the World Trade 
Centre building in Colombo metropolitan.160 The sacred “Temple of Tooth” in Kandy 
was attacked in January 1998; in addition, the assassination attempt of President 
Kumaratunga in December 1999 and the attack on Bandaranayke International Airport in 
July 2001 were among the other major subside attacks.161 
President Kumaratunga’s government had failed in its “war for peace” strategy. 
The intense fighting caused heavy damage to both sides in terms of lives and military 
equipment. After losing a no-confidence motion, she dissolved the parliament. Winning 
the parliamentary elections of December 2001, Ranil Wicktamasinghe of the UNP 
established a new government under SLFP President Kumaratunga. This had created a 
conflicting political environment on the island. At the same time, the Eelam War III 
ended with the unilateral cease-fire and declaration by the LTTE of their willingness to 
negotiate with the government for peace. Analyzing this uncommon stance of the LTTE, 
Hashim wrote, 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States had made the LTTE 
leadership more amenable to  sitting down and talking with the 
government, because it had come to realized that the international 
community was now less tolerant of violence by non-state actors across 
the globe. The LTTE feared its already tarnished image might be further 
damaged if it did not show a willingness to engage in political 
compromise, particularly since there was now a government in Colombo 
that had expressed a distinct desire to negotiate an agreement.162      
The “no war, no peace” situation from 2002 to 2006 ended with failed 
negotiations, but made the LTTE stronger. With extensive financial support from the 
Tamil diaspora, the LTTE became so strong that “almost nobody, including officials in 
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the government, thought it could be beaten.”163  President Mahinda Rajapaksa, successor 
of President Kumaratunga, came to power in November 2005 and continued with peace 
negotiations. However, the increasing atrocities of the LTTE made Rajapaksa’s 
government re-commence counterinsurgency operations by mid-2006.  During this 
Eelam War IV, luck was not with the LTTE. The political will of President Rajapaksa, 
the neutral stance of India—unlike in the past—and international support created a 
favorable environment for the Sri Lankan government to defeated the LTTE. After nearly 
three years of sheer struggle with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, Sri Lanka 
defeated the LTTE militarily on May 19, 2009.  
Apart from the military initiatives to defeat terrorism, political initiatives, too, had 
taken place extensively. Since 1983, all successive governments had engaged in peace 
negotiations to find solutions to the conflict. Negotiations for peace through external third 
parry intervention, as well as domestic peace attempts were noticeable throughout the 
conflict. Under Jayewardene’s government, the Thimpu peace talks in July 1985, the 
Indo-Lanka peace accord of 1987, and the IPKF action from 1989 to 1990 had failed to 
achieve peace. Even after the recognition of Tamil as an official language, the LTTE did 
not give up the separatist movement. President Premadasa’s government engaged in 
peace talks during the period from 1989 to 1990 but failed to achieve lasting peace. 
Under President Kumaratunga’s government, once again several attempts for peace 
negotiation occurred. From October 1994 to March 2003, many rounds of peace talks 
were held in Jaffna, Sri Lanka; Thailand (three times); Norway; Germany; Japan; and 
Switzerland but “failed to contain or reduce violence and only extended the civil war.”164 
The Norwegian-backed ceasefire agreement from 2002 to 2006 had the same results as 
previously but strengthened the LTTE’s legitimacy. 
The defeat of the LTTE could not have been possible if the “war on terror” had 
not been declared by the United States because changes in counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency policies of many powerful nations and international organizations 
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contributed to enforce many restrictions on terrorism and its related activities worldwide. 
Therefore, due to this changed global environment, after 2001, international terrorism and 
insurgency were in decline. Hence, the government of Sri Lanka was able to take 
advantage of the situation to strengthen its counterinsurgency mechanism while the 
LTTE was not in a position to sustain its capabilities.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Since the time of Sri Lanka’s independence, many badly formed policies of 
successive governments have provoked the divisions of the society on ethnic lines. Some 
of the legislation that was passed offended the Tamil minority. To show their 
dissatisfaction with government policies, peaceful demonstrations organized by Tamils 
often ended up in ethnic riots. Some agreed-upon settlements to solve the problems of the 
minorities were repealed due to political outbidding of the majority Sinhalese. The lost 
opportunity to implement the Bandaranaike-Chevanayakam Pact in 1957 gradually paved 
the way for several militant groups to emerge as saviors in the Tamils’ struggle for 
independence. Economic reforms and the “open economy” introduced to the country in 
the early 1980s further increased the ethnic problem due to the imbalance created in the 
domestic agrarian market system. This trade liberalization benefited the export sector but 
resulted in the decline in the price of domestic food crops. 
The LTTE that emerged as the sole representative of the Tamils gained its 
strength to wage a protracted war against the government. Much needed funds to sustain 
the fight came through the Tamil diaspora. Backed by the Sea Tiger, Black Tiger, and Air 
Tiger wings, the suicide cadres of the LTTE were more effective in their missions. Failed 
peace attempts always led to increased violence. The LTTE used peace talks to regroup 
and for training its members, therefore, at the end of every peace attempt, the LTTE 
emerged more powerful than before. 
The changing world order influenced the counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka. On its 
way to defeat insurgency and terrorism, successive governments experienced many 
challenges, such as domestic politics, military modernization, managing regional and 
global powers, and economic development. World powers and key international 
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institutions realized the real threat of terrorism after the 9/11 terrorist attack happened in 
the United States. The immediate shift in counterterrorism with the U.S.-led “war on 
terror” helped Sri Lanka to shape its counterinsurgency program. The lessons learned 
from the past, the improved capabilities of the Sri Lankan security forces and changed 
external approaches to counterterrorism finally facilitated the victory over the protracted 
counterterrorism campaign in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the most important contributory 
factor—the changing regional and global environment, especially the pre-2001 and post-
2001 regional and international approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—
are discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
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III. IMPACT OF CHANGING EXTERNAL CONDITIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III discusses the regional and international settings during the period 
from 1976 up to 2009. Analyzing the global and regional changes in this period help to 
evaluate the conditions that shaped the insurgency movement in Sri Lanka and 
counterinsurgency efforts by the government of Sri Lanka. When considering the world 
occurrences, this period can be divided into three different segments. First, the Cold War 
era up to 1991, second, the post-Cold War era from 1992 up to the 9/11 terrorist attack in 
2001, and third, the U.S.-led “war on terror” from 2002 up to 2009. The first hypothesis 
argues that the change in international opinion after September 11, 2001, affected foreign 
collaboration, which then had an impact on defeating terrorism and insurgency in Sri 
Lanka. Thus, the first potential conclusion is that if the war on terror had not been 
declared by the United States in 2001, it may not have been possible for the government 
of Sri Lanka to defeat Tamil terrorism and insurgency on the island in 2009. The civil 
war would have continued. 
Similarly, the second hypothesis involves India, especially in terms of 
understanding the regional setting. This chapter points to three main eras in Indian 
politics. First, from 1976 up to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, 
second, from 1985 up to the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and 
third, from 1992 up to 2009. The related and second hypothesis explores the Sri Lankan 
government’s role in managing India during the period from 2006 to 2009. India’s 
influence on the Tamil separatist movement in the north and east of Sri Lanka had a 
direct impact on the Sri Lankan government’s policy decisions on counterinsurgency. 
Therefore, the second potential hypothesis suggests that India’s supportive stance, unlike 
in the past and despite Tamil Nadu pressure, facilitated the Sri Lankan government in the 
continuation of its successful counterinsurgency operations in 2009.  
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B. INTERNATIONAL SETTING: COLD WAR ERA UP TO 1991 
The end of World War II created a bipolar world with political and security 
antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the 
two super powers and a host of regional powers supported their favored allies. State-
sponsored insurgency was used as a tool to contain or spread communism. As an 
example, the United States was supporting the Contras in Nicaragua, the Park regime in 
South Korea, and the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union supported the 
communists in Vietnam, Angola, Greece, and South Africa. As highlighted by Daniel 
Byman, “State support or sponsorship of an insurgency as an instrument of foreign policy 
was common during the Cold War.”165 After World War II, the naval power of the 
United States increased, and its bases spread into the continents. “Sri Lanka, as a result of 
her strategic position, was a part of this evolving process and was tied to a global 
strategy.”166 The U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk visited Colombo harbor for a four-day 
visit in November 1985 to check the infrastructure available for larger ships. The United 
States also established a Voice of America broadcasting station north of Colombo that 
relayed programs from Washington.  
Meanwhile, regional powers such as India also asserted their position. India had 
voiced her concerns over the establishment of this broadcasting station, claiming, “This 
[Voice of America] station can broadcast low-frequency messages to U.S. nuclear 
submarines in the northern Indian Ocean.”167 In addition, the Indian government 
disclosed its protest when the president of Israel visited Sri Lanka on November 20, 
1986. The Soviet Union, too, condemned the West’s involvement in Sri Lanka. When 
President Mikhail Gorbachev visited New Delhi in January 1987, he expressed his 
concerns, stating that “the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka is one of the examples to prove 
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how the contemporary mechanism of imperialist intervention and diktata operates.”168 
Whilst India was supplying arms to Tamil insurgents, the Israeli and British advisors and 
a shipment of South African arms arrived in Sri Lanka. In addition, “The Israeli Interest 
section had been opened in the U.S. embassy in Sri Lanka.”169   
The spread of economic liberalization across the world during and after the 1970s 
promoted new forms of economic, political, and social activates in countries in the form 
of globalization. Changes in economic structures reduced international conflicts, but 
created and aggravated more internal wars. For instance, the liberal economic policies 
implemented by the government of Sri Lanka in 1977 intensified the Tamil separatist 
movement on the island and, at the same time, produced the left radicals such as the 
JanathaVimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Increased levels of globalization shaped a decisive 
shift in global security through migration as well. Fiona B. Adamson argued that “the 
increased mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information creates 
incentives for political entrepreneurs to engage in transnational political mobilization and 
to build social and political movements that stretch across state boundaries.”170 
According to United Nations statistics, more than 232 million people live outside their 
native countries.171  
The new trend of migrant communities allowed many of the Sri Lankan Tamils to 
settle in European countries, North America, and Australia, which created an active 
Tamil diaspora. According to Byman’s analysis, the insurgents in Sri Lanka received 
varied and important support from the Tamil diaspora, which “significantly increased 
insurgent’s capabilities and enabled them to withstand government counterinsurgency 
efforts.”172 
                                                 
168 Wilson, Break-Up of Sri Lanka, 201. 
169 Ibid., 177–178. 
170 Fiona B. Adamson, “Globalization, Transnational Political Mobilization, and Networks of 
Violence,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2010): 45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09557570500059548.   
171 United Nations Population Fund, accessed October 14, 2015, http://www.unfpa.org/migration. 
172 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 41. 
 46 
C. INTERNATIONAL SETTING: POST-COLD WAR ERA UP TO 2001 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused changes in 
political, economic, security, and international relations in the world. With the 
readjustment and opening of state borders, finance flowed to new regions, creating new 
opportunities for criminal and terrorist groups. National-liberation, religious-
fundamentalist and criminal organizations established their international networks with 
the help of rapidly developing modern communication. According to former UN 
representative Gordon Weiss, “the flood of small arms opened by the availability of 
massive armories in ex-Soviet Bloc nations was chandelled by warlord businessmen to 
national liberation groups fighting ‘small wars.’”173 In his report in the Small Arms 
Survey, Chris Smith summarizes that “the LTTE has proved itself extremely adept at 
trawling international networks to facilitate the movement of illegal SALW [small arms 
and light weapons].”174 During this period, apart from the “traditional networks” in 
Cyprus, Hong Kong, Lebanon, and Singapore, the LTTE had obtained heavy machine 
guns, surface-to-air missiles, pressure mines, and explosives through the illegal arms 
markets in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, and Ukraine.175  
In the 1990s, the approval given to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
participate in the discussions and secessions in international organizations, including in 
the United Nations, paved the way for non-state actors to consolidate internationally. By 
taking advantage of this changed external condition, pro-LTTE activists in the NGO 
forums gave legitimacy to the LTTE in the international arena, thus creating avenues for 
them to launch strong NGO campaigns to gain support for their cause.176 In December 
1994, however, concerning the growing global security threats as the result of 
international terrorism, the United Nations passed resolution A/RES/49/60 that appealed 
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to countries to adopt policies appropriate for curbing terrorism.177 As a result, apart from 
training the Sri Lankan military, “the United States designated the LTTE as a foreign 
terrorist organization [FTO] in 1997.”178 In doing so, it became the second foreign 
country to proscribe the LTTE as an FTO after India, which had designated it as a 
terrorist organization in 1992.179 This created a huge setback in the fundraising activities 
of the LTTE and, most importantly, it delegitimized the LTTE’s activities internationally. 
Four years after the U.S. designation of LTTE as an FTO, the United Kingdom 
proscribed the LTTE as an FTO in March 2001. However, the continuing tolerance of 
pro-LTTE movements by the majority of the countries in the world, until the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attack, continued to strengthen the LTTE both financially and 
militarily. 
D. THE UNITED STATES-LED WAR ON TERROR AND THE LTTE 
The 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York City changed the international 
opinion on global terrorism. The internationally supported U.S.-led “war on terror” dealt 
a huge blow to transnational terrorist activities. The United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1368 (2001), passed the day after the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, condemned 
the incident “as a threat to international peace and security.”180 The Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted on September 28, 2001, included a number of responses 
given top priority that required states to undertake actions preventing and suppressing the 
financing of terrorist acts.181 Simultaneously, other international organizations like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Ministerial Council of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) expressed their willingness 
to contribute to the fight against terrorism through enhanced cooperation with other 
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similar organizations and states. While the international community and international 
organizations including the United Nations took actions against terrorism, the Sri Lankan 
government exploited this changing situation to strengthen its counterinsurgency 
mechanism. 
Increased bilateral relations with the United States opened avenues for the Sri 
Lankan security forces to strengthen U.S.–Sri Lankan military relations. Sri Lankan 
Prime Minister Wickremesinge met President Bush at the White House in July 2002 and 
requested “U.S. support for peace and economic development in Sri Lanka. It was the 
first visit to Washington by a Sri Lankan leader since 1984.”182 In order to observe the 
training requirements of the security forces, a defense assessment team from the United 
States visited Sri Lanka in September 2002. “The United States and Sri Lanka held their 
ninth consecutive joint military exercise from January-March 2003.”183 In addition, a 
training agreement was signed between the two countries. To enhance naval relations, the 
USS Blue Ridge arrived in Colombo in February 2005. In order to increase the navy’s 
capabilities, the United States Coast Guard offshore patrol vessel USCG Courageous was 
donated to the Sri Lanka Navy.184 Sri Lanka benefited from this assistance because of a 
shift in the U.S. policy on terrorism. 
The increased enthusiasm among the international community to support the 
global war on terrorism led by the United States reduced the number of countries helping 
non-state actors engaged in international terrorism. The international restrictions imposed 
on the LTTE as a part of the “war on terror” impacted its survival. Of the many 
restrictions enforced, the following were significant: 
• In 2001, the United Kingdom and Australia proscribed the LTTE as an 
FTO.185  
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• The Patriot Act of 2001 and the Anti-Terrorist Financing Act “has resulted 
in the withholding of roughly $4 billion from the LTTE and made it more 
difficult for the group to acquire weapons.”186  
• In October 2001, the Canadian police in Toronto intercepted and arrested 
forty LTTE gang members involved in fund collection actives.187 
• In 2003, for the first time, Thailand apprehended three LTTE members 
trying to acquire weapons in Thailand.188 
• In 2005, the UK Charity Commission delisted the Tamil Rehabilitation 
Organization (TRO)—one of the LTTE front organizations— as a 
charitable organization.189   
• In 2006, proscription of the LTTE in Canada immobilized the activities of 
the World Tamil Movement in Montreal.190  
• In August 2006, the United States arrested four LTTE members “engaged 
in negotiation with an undercover FBI agent to purchase and export ten 
SA-18 heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles and launchers, 500 AK-47s, and 
other military equipment for the LTTE.”191  
• In 2006, the European Union proscribed the LTTE as an FTO.192 
• In 2007, U.S. and French authorities banned the Tamil Television 
Network from using its systems.193 
• In April 2007, France apprehended the leader and the thirteen others in the 
LTTE’s office in Paris.194   
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• In April 2007, the FBI arrested the leader of the LTTE office in the United 
States.195 
• In May 2007, Australia arrested two LTTE members involved in fund 
collections and seized $520,000.196 
• In June 2007, the authorities arrested the president of the British Tamil 
Association and “a British court later froze all of his assets, worth four 
billion  pounds sterling.”197 
The outlawing of the LTTE in the international arena reached its apex after 2006, 
in which Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government in Sri Lanka was able to intensify its 
operations against the LTTE. With intelligence-sharing among the international 
community, the Sri Lanka Navy destroyed eight LTTE warehouse ships between 
September 2006 and October 2007. Those large vessels carried over ten thousand tons of 
military arsenals, which included artillery and motor rounds, three aircrafts in dismantled 
form, torpedoes and missiles, and other military equipment.198 
Increased military assistance expedited the counterterrorism campaign in Sri 
Lanka. Apart from support from the United States and other European countries, Sri 
Lanka received other military assistance from Asian and eastern European countries, 
including China, Israel, and Russia. In 2007, China agreed to provide $37.6 million worth 
of military equipment to Sri Lanka.199 Israel provided unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
and fast attack crafts. Similarly, Russia supplied transport helicopters. Sri Lanka acquired 
MiG 27 fighters from Ukraine and rocket launchers from Pakistan. India and the United 
States supplied military radars and maritime surveillance systems. “In addition to 
material support, India, Pakistan, and the United States provided the advanced military 
training and shared critical intelligence with Sri Lanka.”200 The dramatic change in the 
external setting after September 11, 2001, was the turning point in Sri Lanka’s efforts in 
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fighting insurgency and terrorism on the island. Both direct and indirect actions of the 
states around the world in restraining the transnational illegal and criminal activities of 
the LTTE created the conditions for its decline after 2001. 
E. REGIONAL SETTING:  FROM 1976 TO 1984 
Backed by the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971, and after its first nuclear 
test in 1974, India in 1976 attempted to emerge as the hegemonic power in South Asia 
and became concerned about the developing American interest in Sri Lanka.201 The pro-
western foreign policy of J. R. Jayewardene’s UNP government in 1977 hindered Indo-
Lanka relations and, in turn, this created conditions for India to utilize the insurgency to 
interfere in the domestic politics of Sri Lanka. The rivalry between the two state leaders 
did not end until the tragic death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. As Jayaratnam 
Wilson explains,  
In 1979 President Jayewardene sent a special peace mission to Mrs. 
Gandhi which was instructed to tell her that the Jayawardane family had 
been friends of the Nehrus for the previous forty years and that he would 
like to maintain these links. The effort made no impression.202  
In 1981, President Jayewardene expressed his concerns on the Indian stance 
regarding Sri Lanka, stating, “You [India] can conquer us but you cannot conqueror our 
spirit.”203 In countering that statement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed her 
views, stating that she would have ordered the Indian Army to invade Ceylon.204  
Mistrust between the two leaders badly affected the Sri Lankan actions 
suppressing the insurgency that emerged in the 1970s. Minister Indira Gandhi’s 
supportive stance for the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka dramatically altered the dynamics 
of the separatist movement.205 India began training Tamil militants. Expressing the views 
of one Tamil militant on this military training, Narayan Swamy writes, “One middle-
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ranking guerilla said: ‘Until 1983 I found it difficult to attract people into the Tamil 
movement. Once India entered the picture, there was a rush for joining our struggle that I 
found it difficult to control the crowds.’”206 
India’s decision to back the Tamil insurgency was influenced by domestic politics 
in Tamil Nadu. The South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, predominantly Tamil, shared 
historical links with the Tamils in northern Sri Lanka. After the Black July riots in 1983, 
the influx of the Sri Lankan-displaced Tamils in Tamil Nadu promoted the Sri Lanka 
Tamil cause and brought about massive political support. Some politicians in the Tamil 
Nadu government who supported the separatist movement in Sri Lanka were influential 
in Indian central government actions on Sri Lanka, too. Indira Gandhi also was insecure 
about losing support in Tami Nadu after the insurgency, which weakened her hold in the 
country. 
F. REGIONAL SETTING:  FROM 1985 TO 1991 
Unlike his mother, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi adopted a positive stance 
regarding the Sri Lankan issue. However, his efforts to solve the problem ended without 
much success. Rajiv Gandhi took office as the youngest prime minster of India 
subsequent to his mother’s death on October 31, 1984. The assassination of Indira 
Gandhi “was a severe blow to the Tamil resistance leaders, who had to start all over again 
with her son Rajiv.”207 Rajiv Gandhi held office until his defeat in 1989. In 1985, he 
facilitated the Thimpu peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the leaders of 
the Tamil political parties.208 In order to shift the debate on the Tamil problem to a 
constructive dialogue, in July 1985, Rajiv Gandhi expressed his views, saying, “The 
Ceylon Tamils should not expect a separate state or a federal state but something similar 
to what India has.”209  
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Some countries, but not others, supported Rajiv Gandhi’s stance on the Sri 
Lankan problem. “The United States and Britain have both recognized India as the 
mediating power in the Ceylon imbroglio.”210 Contrary to the U.S. and the U.K. stances, 
the People’s Republic of China openly supported the government of Sri Lanka, stating 
that China was “totally opposed to the division of Sri Lanka.” In April 1985, after 
President Jayewardene visited Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq’s government agreed to 
provide military training for the Sri Lankans. India also protested the Israel president’s 
visit to Sri Lanka in November 1986, stating, “Ceylon cannot expect India to be a 
mediator in the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict while at the same time it acts in a way that is 
hostile to Indian interest.”211  
The changing stance of Rajiv Gandhi’s government from positive to an 
antagonistic posture was obvious by 1987. Indian fighter jets and transport planes entered 
Sri Lankan airspace—violating international rules and helping the Tamil militants by 
dropping some 25 tons of relief materials, including food items. Sri Lanka could do 
nothing because “India warned of serious consequences if the planes were shot. A 
shocked Sri Lanka had no choice but to comply.”212 India’s involvement in the Sri 
Lankan case reached its apex with the arrival of the IPKF in Sri Lanka in July 1987. 
However, Rajiv Gandhi paid the consequences for his action later. An LTTE suicide 
bomber assassinated him on May 21, 1991 at Siperumbudur in Chennai India. 
G. REGIONAL SETTING:  FROM 1992 TO 2009 
India’s strategy of protecting the LTTE from military annihilation became neutral 
after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on Indian soil by a Tamil suicide bomber in 1991. 
Before his assassination, Rajiv Gandhi was defeated in the 1989 election where V. P 
Singh became the prime minister. It was during his campaign for the 1991 elections that 
he was assassinated. The new Indian government decided to withdraw the IPKF in 
December 1989 and “the last of Indian soldiers sailed out of Trincomalee on March 24, 
                                                 
210 Wilson, Break-up of Sri Lanka, 200. 
211 Ibid., 202. 
212 Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind, 154. 
 54 
1990.”213 The vacuum created by the withdrawal of the IPKF paved the way for the 
LTTE to take the control of over one-third of Sri Lanka’s land area “and almost two-
thirds of Sri Lankan’s coastline.”214 Narayan Swamy summarized India’s withdrawal 
from Sri Lanka by stating, “Asia had seen nothing like this since the Viet Cong humbled 
the mighty U.S. over a decade ago in similar circumstances.”215  In 1992, a year after 
Rajiv Gandhi’s death, India outlawed the LTTE as a terrorist organization, becoming the 
first country to proscribe the LTTE as terrorists. From then until its military defeat in 
2009—despite the pressure from the state of Tamil Nadu and outside LTTE sympathizers 
requesting a lift of the ban—successive Indian governments extended the LTTE ban. The 
Indian decision to proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist organization created conditions in the 
international diplomatic corps where the recognition of the legitimacy of the LTTE 
became a problem.216  
The existence of LTTE operatives on Indian soil became difficult after 1992. 
From 1992 to 2009, successive governments of India “played a significant behind-the-
scenes role in Sri Lanka. Indian and Sri Lankan leaders often exchanged views on the 
telephone while the war against the LTTE raged.”217 Indian authorities adopted a series 
of severe measures against the LTTE, who had once enjoyed protection in India. “Despite 
the protests from a section of politicians in Tamil Nadu, New Delhi has continued to 
assist Colombo militarily.”218 India’s domestic setting had also changed drastically as 
coalition governments at the center intervened in the Tamil politicians’ influence. In 
November 1991, the Indian Navy seized the LTTE ship MV Ongova, which was 
smuggling arms and ammunition.219 In January 1993, the Indian Navy detected the LTTE 
ship MV Yahath smuggling arms and ammunitions in the Bay of Bengal; however, it was 
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scuttled by the LTTE to avoid capture.220 In May 1998, the Indian Navy destroyed the 
LTTE ship MV Mariamman off Andaman Island, which was transporting armaments.221 
In January 2006, the Sri Lanka Navy apprehended 60,000 detonators smuggled from 
Tamil Nadu. At the same time, Indian authorities seized tons of explosives, arms, and 
ammunition off the coast of Tamil Nadu. By this time, it was clear that “the Tigers’ 
dependence on Tamil Nadu was threatened: meanwhile, paralleled growing difficulties 
with the Western countries, many of which had outlawed LTTE as a terrorist outfit,”222 
weakened the LTTE further. Evaluating India’s role after 1992, Swamy summarizes,  
Despite its bitter experience, India never lost its focus vis-à-vis Sri Lanka. 
After hands-off approach for many years following Rajiv Gandhi’s 
assassination, New Delhi resumed its active interest in the affairs of the 
country. While adamantly refusing to support any break up of Sri Lanka, 
India made it clear that it will remain an interested party in the affairs of 
the Tamil minority.”223  
While it switched its stance on the LTTE, it remained committed to interfering in 
Sri Lankan politics.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The success over the LTTE could not have been possible if the United States of 
America had not declared the “global war on terror” on one hand, and on the other hand, 
if India’s supportive stance, despite Tamil Nadu pressure, had not facilitated the Sri 
Lankan government to continue its successful counterinsurgency operations in 2009. 
Many powerful countries and international organizations changed their perspectives on 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies after 2001. This contributed to the 
enforcing of many restrictions on terrorism and its related activities worldwide. 
Therefore, due to this changing environment after December 2001, international terrorism 
and insurgency were on the decline. However, the international setting was different 
during the Cold War era. The ideological power struggles between superpowers 
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eventually divided the world into two power blocks, although some states remained 
nonaligned. Sri Lanka’s neutral stance in world affairs during the 1960s helped manage 
regional and international issues diplomatically, but it struggled in formulating solutions 
for the emerging domestic ethnic issue. The situation in Sri Lanka began to change when 
a new UNP government came into power in 1977. The cordial relationship it had enjoyed 
with its powerful neighbor, India, changed with the open economic policies of the new 
government, which also aggravated the internal conflict in Sri Lanka. 
To face the emerging trends of globalization in the 1980s, the Sri Lankan 
government made some liberal economic policy decisions that attracted the western 
world. These pro-West foreign policies of President Jayewardene’s UNP government 
created conditions for then pro-Soviet India to interfere with the domestic affairs in Sri 
Lanka. By the 1970s, backed by the Soviet Union, India emerged as the main power in 
South Asia. The antagonistic approach of President Jayewardene provoked India and 
made Indira Gandhi’s government covertly support the Tamil militants, which later 
developed as a protracted armed struggled against the government of Sri Lanka.  
The end of the Cold War in early 1990 opened a new world order in which 
transnational criminal activities and terrorism spread rapidly and freely across open 
borders. Due to the liberal migration policies of many countries during this era, the 
diaspora activities supporting terrorism in the forms of fundraising and propaganda 
reached its apex in Europe, North America, and the United States. Terrorist organizations 
around the world, including the LTTE, benefitted from the easily accessible weapon 
markets in ex-Soviet Bloc. The undue recognition of NGOs in the international affairs 
facilitated non-state actors to promote their causes internationally, even at discussions in 
the United Nations. The pro-LTTE activists exploited this situation and dominated the 
NGO forum to gain some legitimacy for the LTTE internationally. 
After identifying the mounting threats to world peace, the United Nations took 
preventive actions on terrorism. Resolutions passed in the general assembly urged 
member states to implement actions against terrorism. In 1992, India proscribed the 
LTTE as a terrorist organization. Since then, the LTTE depended purely on the funds 
generated in other European countries, including North America and Australia, through 
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their diaspora. The United States proscribed the LTTE as an FTO in 1997. This was a big 
blow to the fundraising and money laundering of the LTTE oversees. The proscription of 
the LTTE both in India and in the United States created some difficulties for the 
organization initially, but there was tolerance of LTTE activities in other countries 
despite the United Nations’ efforts to crush terrorism, that created safe havens for 
sympathizers who support the LTTE both financially and militarily. Due to that support, 
terrorism continued in Sri Lanka.  
The aftermath of the tragic 9/11 terrorist attack created a significant ideological 
shift among the international community, where almost all countries, including 
international organizations, started to support the U.S.-led “war on terror.” The Sri 
Lankan government benefitted from these changed external conditions in their 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Because of increased bilateral relations 
with the United States, after 18 years, Sri Lanka was able to gain the most wanted 
defense assistance to fight against the LTTE. The proscription of the LTTE 
internationally curtailed all of its activities—especially fundraising and arms smuggling. 
The pro-LTTE stance of India continued during the first few years of Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s rule. However, at the latter stage, his policies changed. The 
consequence of the Indo-Lanka peace treaty and the induction of the IPKF finally 
resulted in the killing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE. However, by then, 
India’s position had shifted regarding the internal conflict in Sri Lanka. The successive 
Indian governments after 1991, despite Tamil Nadu pressure, adopted a neutral potion—
sometimes supportive on counterterrorism in Sri Lanka—but paid more attention to the 
rights of the Tamil minority on the island. 
When considering global affairs from 1976 to 2009, the changing international 
environment influenced international terrorism, which in turn had an impact on the 
internal conflict in Sri Lanka as well. The Sri Lankan government was able to win its 
thirty years of war against the LTTE mainly due to the changed external conditions on 
counterterrorism, especially after two incidents: first, al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack in 2001, and 
second, Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991. Therefore, the Sri Lankan case presents a 
good study by which the impact of changing external conditions on counterinsurgency 
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can be evaluated. While counterinsurgency efforts are important, external conditions in 
our globalized world are increasingly important to study domestic insurgency. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
The Sri Lankans suffered from the violence of insurgency and terrorism for over 
thirty years. From 1980 to 2006, the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies of 
successive governments did not achieve the expected results. Due to the erroneous 
domestic policies and as a result of the changing external conditions, the Tamil 
insurgency on the island evolved as a hybrid terrorist organization. Despite an enormous 
economic destruction, this protracted conflict caused nearly 90,000 deaths, including the 
assassinations of two heads of states both in India and in Sri Lanka.  
To create a separate state for Tamils, the LTTE was engaged in an armed struggle, 
within which they developed as one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the 
world. The LTTE, which started with few members in 1976, had evolved as a full-
fledged terrorist organization with nearly 25,000 cadres by 2006.224 The organization 
encompassed all the components needed to become a conventional force—land, sea, and 
air capabilities. Along with the use of suicide terrorism, the land, sea, and air wings of the 
LTTE created a very lethal force. What allowed the LTTE to evolve as such a dangerous 
force? Without external assistance, it was impossible for terrorists to survive on a tiny 
island nation like Sri Lanka. Therefore, the state-sponsored terrorism, diaspora support, 
liberal social policies of western countries and the behaviors of non-state actors, 
particularly prior to December 2001, created favorable conditions for the LTTE to 
become almost a conventional force to wage a protracted war for 30 years.   
In this thesis, I examined the question of why Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism 
strategy succeeded in 2009 when it had previously failed. I argue here that 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities are shaped by external conditions. The 
two situations discussed in the thesis—the changed in external conditions after the 9/11 
terrorist attack in 2001 and India’s stance over the Sri Lankan issue—emphasized the fact 
that external conditions influenced counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Sri Lanka.  
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The changes in the international setting that related to counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism in Sri Lanka from 1976 to 2009 are noticeable during four significant 
eras. The first is the Cold War era up to 1991. During this period, western involvement in 
the Sri Lankan affairs and the ignorance of the Sri Lankan government about her closest 
and most influential neighbor—India—as a seemingly friendly nation, finally caused 
problems. India started to support the Tamil insurgency movement on the island by 
providing arms, training, and safe havens for insurgents.  
Second, economic liberalization unfurled with the emergence of the globalization 
process in the late 1970s, which promoted new forms of economic activities in Sri Lanka. 
While the liberal economic policies attracted foreign investment, they also exaggerated 
insurgency and terrorism on the island by creating new disparities and, at the same time, 
new sources for expression. During this period, a new trend in international migration 
permitted many Tamils to settle in western countries, especially Europe, creating a strong 
diaspora community that later became one of the strongest supports for the LTTE. This 
external support eventually strengthened the fighting capabilities of the organization as 
well as created a powerful LTTE propaganda mechanism overseas.  
Third, the aftermath of the Cold War is important because this period, mainly up 
to 2002, is marked with many changes in the international system, which had an impact 
on international terrorism. Transnational criminal activities by warlords and non-state 
actors, especially in the fields of gunrunning and money laundering, have increased. By 
using its front organizations, the LTTE exploited this changed external situation to 
further strengthen their organization both financially and militarily. The involvement of 
NGOs in global forums also increased significantly during this period. The LTTE and 
their sympathizers took advantage of NGOs to gain much-required legitimacy for their 
organization internationally. However, due to the growing threat of terrorism, the 
international community, including the United Nations, initiated actions against 
terrorism. The near outcome of this action was the proscription of the LTTE as an FTO in 
the United States in 1997. Though this was a setback in the international activities of the 
organization, the liberal social policies of many European states prior to the 9/11 terrorist 
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attack in 2001 allowed pro-LTTE movements to freely engage in their propaganda and 
fundraising activities.  
The fourth era is the post 9/11 period. The shift in international opinion after 
September 11, 2001, to fight the global war on terrorism had an impact on the defeat of 
the terrorists and insurgency in Sri Lanka. The United Nations and other international 
organizations imposed stern policy decisions in support of the U.S.-led “war on terror.” 
As stated earlier, this changing situation benefited the Sri Lankan government’s fight 
against terrorism, and the government exploited this situation to strengthen its 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mechanism. Increased cooperation with the 
United States helped Sri Lanka to develop the capabilities of its security forces. Material 
support and intelligence-sharing increased the confidence of the troops fighting against 
the LTTE. Most importantly, the involvement of the United States in fighting 
international terrorism reduced the number of countries supporting non-state actors 
engaged in international terrorism. The proscription of the LTTE and its related activities 
worldwide was a huge blow to the organization in terms of fundraising, propaganda, arms 
procurement, and arms smuggling. The proscription of the LTTE and its front 
organizations reached its apex by 2006, when the majority of the European countries, 
including the European Union, banned the LTTE. Not only that, Asian and European 
countries, including China, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia, provided much-needed military 
assistance for the Sri Lankan government to fight against the LTTE. When considering 
their previous activities, due to the worldwide restrictions on terrorism, the fighting 
capabilities of the LTTE were in decline after 2002. 
At the regional level, the Indo-Lanka relationship became a decisive factor in 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Sri Lanka. During the Cold War, the Soviet 
backing for India was obvious. In the early 1980s, the West-biased Sri Lankan policies 
created a problem for East-biased India to maintain cordial relations with her neighbor—
Sri Lanka. India misunderstood the new open economic policies of President 
Jayewardene and was suspicious about the western involvement in the island. The 
decision by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1982 to support Tamil militants in Sri Lanka 
prevented apprehension of the LTTE leader. On the other hand, it created greater 
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enthusiasm among the Tamil youths joining the insurgency to follow military training in 
India. If India extradited the leader of the LTTE organization—Prabhakaran—to Sri 
Lanka in 1982, the situation would have been different today. The civil war would not 
have occurred. The 90,000 human lives lost, including those of two world leaders, would 
have been saved.   
The tragic death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 was a setback for the 
LTTE. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who came to power after his mother’s death, 
continued her policy of supporting the insurgents, but attempted to solve the Sri Lankan 
problem. However, the domestic politics in Tamil Nadu influenced the Indian central 
government actions on Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi intervened in the Sri 
Lankan government’s actions fighting the insurgency. As a result, the IPKF arrived in Sri 
Lanka in July 1987 and remained in the island until March 1990.  
The existence of the LTTE on Indian soil became difficult after the assassination 
of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. India proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization in 1992, becoming the world’s first country to do so. Since then, successive 
Indian governments continued this policy. Indian proscription curtailed the mobility of 
the LTTE in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian Navy either apprehended or destroyed a 
number of LTTE cargo vessels smuggling arms and ammunitions to Sri Lanka. Since 
1980, the changing regional conditions fueled the Sri Lankan insurgency and terrorism 
initially, but later, since 1992, the Indian position changed. India did not interfere with 
the Sri Lankan action defeating the LTTE. 
B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
In this thesis, I endeavored to determine why the counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism theories did not work in a certain timeframe and worked later in the 
context of countering insurgency and terrorism in Sri Lanka. The findings proved that the 
changing external condition, both international and regional, had an impact on the Sri 
Lankan case. As Narayan Swamy concludes,  
Sri Lanka’s decisive victory over the LTTE is the biggest success story in 
the world of anti-terrorism. It is in sharp contrast to the dragging military 
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campaign the U.S. leads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. It also outshines the collapse of the Maoist Shining Path 
movement in Peru. And it came about despite emerging evidence that a 
section of the West tried to save at least some LTTE leaders before the 
war ended on 18 May.225  
When considering how the external environment changed during the life span of 
the LTTE, from 1976 to 2009, it was obvious that the behavior of state-sponsored 
terrorism and liberal social policies of the international community which led to diaspora 
support, affected counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka. 
1. Behavior of External State-Sponsored Terrorism 
Tamil insurgents benefitted from external state-sponsored terrorism. The state 
sponsorship of terrorism was obvious within the initial stage of the Tamil insurgency in 
Sri Lanka. The world order from 1976 to 1991 created conditions for this to happen. The 
failure of the Sri Lankan government to unfold the international and the regional setting 
correctly affected its counterinsurgency efforts. Outside support gave much-needed 
strength to the LTTE. Daniel Byman et al. also highlighted the fact that “both state and 
non-state support for an insurgency can make a movement far more effective, prolong the 
war, increase the scale and lethality of its struggle.”226 Therefore, at the later stage, even 
without support from India, the LTTE continued its atrocities and even became a very 
lethal force. Neighbor in close proximity always have an impact on each other’s political 
affairs. Hence, to achieve their political goals, a country may tend to utilize the 
insurgency or terrorist movement in another country. Therefore, cooperation among 
neighboring states, even if hard to maintain, is essential for countries involved in 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. 
2. Behavior of Diaspora Support 
Tamil diaspora became one of the main assets for the LTTE. The Sri Lankan 
Tamils who migrated and settled mostly in the European countries became the main 
source of income for the LTTE. The Tamil diaspora engaged in fundraising and 
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propaganda activities and faced no interruptions by their host governments. From the 
1980s up to 2002, the international setup was helpful in raising funds to support the 
LTTE. At one point, the organization had collected 80 percent of its annual operating 
budget through the Tamil diaspora. Writing about the LTTE’s fund raising activities, 
Daniel Byman et al. pointed out that “The LTTE network straddles the globe and 
effectively integrates the Tamil diaspora into one overarching external system that 
constitutes the lifeline for LTTE guerrillas on the ground.”227 Due to this enormous 
income, the LTTE was in a better position to fight government forces. On the other hand, 
the Sri Lankan diplomatic efforts to curtail those diaspora activities did not succeed 
because  
Major friendly powers, such as the United States and Britain, declined to 
become more committed to a situation that could only result in a 
worsening of their already strained relations with India. Neither had they 
or other nations shown any willingness to move against the expatiate 
funding that has become the major source of insurgent finance. The result 
was that Sri Lanka had to proceed alone.228  
This unique situation illustrates how the prevailing external conditions affected 
the counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka. The negative world opinion of Sri Lanka prior to 
December 11, 2001, turned completely positive with the change of external conditions 
after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Actions after this event by the international community to 
curtail the Tamil diaspora activities created conditions for the Sri Lankan government to 
effectively engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. If the “war on terror” had 
not been declared by the United States in 2001, it might not have been possible for Sri 
Lanka to defeat terrorism and insurgency on the island in 2009. Therefore, the 
international community’s willingness to cooperate with countries’ fights against 
terrorism and insurgency in the way of continuous monitoring of diaspora activities will 
create conditions to eradicate terrorism and insurgency from those countries. 
A state could not defeat insurgency and terrorism in isolation. After reviewing the 
counterinsurgency campaigns worldwide, Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw came up 
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with four fundamentals that any government should include in their counterinsurgency or 
counterterrorism national plan irrespective of geographic regions, times, and political 
systems. They highlighted “foreign collaboration amongst governments and security 
forces” as the fourth principle.229 This thesis finds that changing external conditions have 
both negative and positive effects on “foreign collaboration,” thereby leading to 
successes as well as failures in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Therefore, 
cooperation among states will vary once the external conditions change. These changing 
external situations create an impact on the countries engaged in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism. Therefore, as summarized by Audrey Kurth Cronin,  
Terrorism is an unprecedented, powerful non-state threat to the 
international system that no single state, regardless of how powerful it 
may be in traditional terms, can defeat alone, especially in the absence of 
long-term, serious scholarship engaged in by its most creative minds.230  
The Sri Lankan case is a classic example of this dynamic. Hence, further studies 
on this aspect of the impact of changing external conditions on counterinsurgency will 
help to develop new counterinsurgency and counterterrorism concepts in the future. 
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